Modern cryptocurrency systems, such as the Ethereum project, permit complex financial transactions through scripts called smart contracts. These smart contracts are executed many, many times, always without real concurrency. First, all smart contracts are serially executed by miners before appending them to the blockchain. Later, those contracts are serially reexecuted by validators to verify that the smart contracts were executed correctly by miners. Serial execution limits system throughput and fails to exploit today's concurrent multicore and cluster architectures. Nevertheless, serial execution appears to be required: contracts share state, and contract programming languages have a serial semantics. This paper presents a novel way to permit miners and validators to execute smart contracts in parallel, based on techniques adapted from software transactional memory. Miners execute smart contracts speculatively in parallel, allowing non-conflicting contracts to proceed concurrently, and "discovering" a serializable concurrent schedule for a block's transactions, This schedule is captured and encoded as a deterministic fork-join program used by validators to re-execute the miner's parallel schedule deterministically but concurrently. We have proved that the validator's execution is equivalent to miner's execution. Smart contract benchmarks run on a JVM with ScalaSTM show that a speedup of 1.39× can be obtained for miners and 1.59× for validators with just three concurrent threads.
the blockchain. The state is manipulated by a set of functions, analogous to methods in many programming languages. Functions can be called either directly by clients or indirectly by other smart contracts. Smart contract languages are typically Turing-complete. To ensure that function calls terminate, the client is charged for each computational step in a function call. If the charge exceeds what the client is willing to pay, the computation is terminated and rolled back.
When and where is smart contract code executed? There are two distinct circumstances. Each smart contract is first executed by one or more miners, nodes that repeatedly propose new blocks to append to the blockchain. When a miner creates a block, it selects a sequence of user requests and executes the associated smart contract code for each Ethereum transaction in sequence, transforming the old contract state into a new state. It then records both the sequence of transactions and the new state in the block, and proposes it for inclusion in the blockchain.
Later, when the block has been appended to the blockchain, each smart contract is repeatedly re-executed by validators: nodes that reconstruct (and check) the current blockchain state. As a validator acquires each successive block, it replays each of the transactions' contract codes to check that the block's initial and final states match. Each miner validates blocks proposed by other miners, and older block are validated by newly-joined miners, or by clients querying the contract state. Code executions for validation vastly exceed code executions for mining.
Existing smart contract designs limit throughput because they admit no concurrency. When a miner creates a block, it assembles a sequence of transactions, and computes a tentative new state by executing those transactions' smart contracts serially, in the order they occur in the block. A miner cannot simply execute these contracts in parallel, because they may perform conflicting accesses to shared data, and an arbitrary interleaving could produce an inconsistent final state. For Bitcoin transactions, it is easy to tell in advance when two transaction conflict, because input and output data are statically declared. For smart contracts, by contrast, it is impossible to tell in advance whether two contract executions will conflict, because the contract language is Turing-complete.
Miners are rewarded for each block they successfully append to the blockchain, so they have a strong incentive to increase throughput by parallelizing smart contract executions. We propose to allow miners to execute contract codes in parallel by adapting techniques from Software Transactional Memory (STM) [12] : treating each invocation as a speculative atomic action. Data conflicts, detected at run-time, are resolved by delaying or rolling back some conflicting invocations. Treating smart contract invocations as speculative atomic actions dynamically "discovers" a serializable concurrent schedule, producing the same final state as a serial schedule where the contract functions were executed in some one-at-a-time order.
But what about later validators? Existing STM systems are non-deterministic: if a later validator simply mimics the miner by re-running the same mix of speculative transactions, it may produce a different serialization order and a different final state, causing validation to fail incorrectly. Treating contract invocations as speculative transactions improves miners' throughput, but fails to support deterministic reexecution as required by validators.
Notice, however, that the miner has already "discovered" a serializable concurrent schedule for those transactions. We propose a novel scheme where the miner records that successful schedule, along with the final state, allowing later validators to replay that same schedule in a concurrent but deterministic way. Deterministic replay avoids many of the the miner's original synchronization costs, such as conflict detection and roll-back. Over time, parallel validation would be a significant benefit because validators perform the vast majority of contract executions. Naturally, the validator must be able to check that the proposed schedule really is serializable ( Fig. 1) .
This paper makes the following contributions.
-A way for miners to speculatively execute smart contracts in parallel. We adapt techniques from transactional boosting [11] to permit non-conflicting smart contracts to execute concurrently. -A way for miners to capture the resulting parallel execution in the form of a fork-join [2] schedule to be executed by validators, deterministically, verifiably, and in parallel. -A formal model and proof that the validator's execution is equivalent to that of the miner. -A prototype implementation, built on the Java virtual machine and ScalaSTM [20] . An evaluation using smart contract examples drawn from the Solidity documentation yields an overall speedup of 1.39× for miners, and 1.59× for validators with three concurrent threads of execution.
Blockchains and smart contracts
In Bitcoin and similar systems, transactions typically have a simple structure, distributing the balances from a set of input accounts to a set of newly-created output accounts. In Blockchains such as Ethereum, however, each block also includes an explicit state capturing the cumulative effect of transactions in prior blocks. A Transaction is expressed as executable code, often called a smart contract, that modifies that state. Ethereum blocks thus contain both transactions' The contracts themselves are stored in the blockchain as byte-code instructions for the Ethereum virtual machine (EVM). Several higher-level languages exist for writing smart contracts. Here, we describe smart contracts as expressed in the Solidity language [21] .
Listing 1 is part of the source code for an example smart contract that implements a ballot box [22] . The owner initializes the contract with a list of proposals and gives the right to vote to a set of Ethereum addresses. Voters cast their votes for a particular proposal, which they may do only once. Alternatively, voters may delegate their vote. The contract keyword declares the smart contract (Line 1).
The contract's persistent state is recorded in state variables. For Ballot , the persistent state includes fields of scalar type such as the owner (omitted for lack of space). State variables such as voters (declared on Line 2) can also use the built-in Solidity type mapping which, in this case, associates each voter's address with a Voter data structure (declaration omitted for brevity). The keys in this mapping are of built-in type address, which uniquely identifies Ethereum accounts (clients or other contracts). These state variables are the persistent state of the contract.
Line 4 declares contract function, vote, to cast a vote for the given proposal. Within a function there are transient memory and stack areas such as sender. The function vote first recovers the Voter data from the contract's state by indexing into the voters mapping using the sender's address msg.sender. The msg variable is a global variable containing data about the contract's current invocation. Next, the sender.vote flag is checked to prevent multiple votes. Note that sequential execution is critical: if this code were naïvely run in parallel, it would be vulnerable to a race condition permitting double voting. Ethereum contract functions can be aborted at any time via throw, as seen here when a voter is detected attempting to vote twice. The throw statement causes the contract's transient state and tentative storage changes to be discarded. Finally, this Ballot contract also provides functions to register voters, delegate one's vote, and compute the winning proposal. The complete Ballot example is available elsewhere. 3 
Execution model: miners and validators
When a miner prepares a block for inclusion in the blockchain, it starts with the ledger state as of the chain's most recent block. The miner selects a sequence of new transactions, records them in the new block, and executes them, one at a time, to compute the new block's state. The miner then participates in a consensus protocol to decide whether this new block will be appended to the blockchain.
To ensure that each transaction terminates in a reasonable number of steps, each call to contract bytecode comes with an explicit limit on the number of virtual machine steps that a call can take. (In Ethereum, these steps are measured in "gas" and clients pay a fee to the miner that successfully appends that transaction's block to the blockchain.)
After a block has been successfully appended to the blockchain, that block's transactions are sequentially reexecuted by every node in the network to check that the block's state transition was computed honestly and correctly. (Smart contract transactions are deterministic, so each reexecution yields the same results as the original.) These validator nodes do not receive fees for re-execution.
To summarize, a transaction is executed in two contexts: once by miners before attempting to append a block to the blockchain, and many times afterward by validators checking that each block in the blockchain is honest. In both contexts, each block's transactions are executed sequentially in block order.
Speculative smart contracts
This section discusses how miners can execute contract codes concurrently. Concurrency for validators is addressed in the next section.
Smart contract semantics is sequential: each miner has a single thread of control that executes one EVM instruction at a time. The miner executes each of the block's contracts in sequence. One contract can call another contract's functions, causing control to pass from the first contract code to the second, and back again. (Indeed, misuse of this control structure has been the source of well-known security breaches [7] .) Clearly, even sequential smart contracts must be written with care, and introducing explicit concurrency to contract programming languages would only make the situation worse. We conclude that concurrent smart contract executions must be serializable: indistinguishable, except for execution time, from a sequential execution.
There are several obstacles to running contracts in parallel. First, smart contract codes read and modify shared storage, so it is essential to ensure that concurrent contract code executions do not result in inconsistent storage states. Second, smart contract languages are Turing-complete, and therefore it is impossible in general to determine statically whether contracts have data conflicts.
We propose that miners execute contract codes as speculative actions. A miner schedules multiple concurrent contracts to run in parallel. Contracts' data structures are instrumented to detect synchronization conflicts at run-time, in much the same way as mechanisms like transactional boosting [11] . If one speculative contract execution conflicts with another, the conflict is resolved either by delaying one contract until the other completes, or by rolling back and restarting one of the conflicting executions. When a speculative action completes successfully, it is said to commit, and otherwise it aborts.
Storage operations
We assume that, as in Solidity, state variables are restricted to predefined types such as scalars, structures, enumerations, arrays, and mappings. A storage operation is a primitive operation on a state variable. For example, binding a key to a value in a mapping, or reading from a variable or an array are storage operations. Two storage operations commute if executing them in either order yields the same result values and the same storage state. For example, in the address-to-Voter Ballot mapping in Listing 1, binding Alice's address to a vote of 42 commutes with binding Bob's address to a vote of 17, but does not commute when deleting Alice's vote. An inverse for a storage operation is another operation that undoes its effects. For example, the inverse of assigning to a variable is restoring its prior value, and the inverse of adding a new key-value pair to a mapping is to remove that binding, and so on. The virtual machine system can provide all storage operations with inverses.
The virtual machine is in charge of managing concurrency for state variables such as mappings and arrays. Speculation is controlled by two run-time mechanisms, invisible to the programmer, and managed by the virtual machine: abstract locks, and inverse logs.
Each storage operation has an associated abstract lock. The rule for assigning abstract locks to operations is simple: if two storage operations map to distinct abstract locks, then they must commute. Before a thread can execute a storage operation, it must acquire the associated abstract lock. The thread is delayed while that lock is held by another thread. 4 Once the lock is acquired, the thread records an inverse operation in a log, and proceeds with the operation.
If the action commits, its abstract locks are released and its log is discarded. If the action aborts, the inverse log is replayed, most recent operation first, to undo the effects of that speculative action. When the replay is complete, the action's abstract locks are released.
The advantage of combining abstract locks with inverse logs is that the virtual machine can support very fine-grained concurrency. A more traditional implementation of speculative actions might associate locks with memory regions such as cache lines or pages, and keep track of old and versions of those regions for recovery. Such a coarse-grained approach could lead to many false conflicts, where operations that commute in a semantic sense are treated as conflicting because they access overlapping memory regions. In the next section, we will see how to use abstract locks to speed up verifiers.
When one smart contract calls another, the run-time system creates a nested speculative action, which can commit or abort independently of its parent. A nested speculative action inherits the abstract locks held by its parent, and it creates its own inverse log. If the nested action commits, any abstract locks it acquired are passed to its parent, and its inverse log is appended to its parent's log. If the nested action aborts, its inverse log is replayed to undo its effects, and any abstract locks it acquired are released. Aborting a child action does not abort the parent, but a child action's effects become permanent only when the parent commits. The abstract locking mechanism also detects and resolves deadlocks, which are expected to be rare.
The scheme described here is eager, acquiring locks, applying operations, and recording inverses. An alternative lazy implementation could buffer changes to a contract's storage, applying them only on commit.
A miner's incentive to perform speculative concurrent execution is the possibility of increased throughput, and hence a competitive advantage against other miners. Of course, the miner undertakes a risk that synchronization conflicts among contracts will cause some contracts to be rolled back and re-executed, possibly delaying block construction, and forcing the miner to re-execute code not compensated by client fees. Nevertheless, the experimental results reported below suggest that even a small degree of concurrent speculative execution pays off, even in the face of moderate data conflicts.
Concurrent validation
The speculative techniques proposed above for miners are no help for validators. Here is the problem: miners use speculation to discover a concurrent schedule for a block's transactions, a schedule equivalent to some sequential schedule, except faster. That schedule is constructed nondeterministically, depending on the order in which threads acquired abstract locks. To check that the block's miner was honest, validators need to reconstruct the same (or an equivalent) schedule chosen by the miner.
Validators need a way to deterministically reproduce the miner's concurrent schedule. To this end, we extend abstract locks to track dependencies, that is, who passed which abstract locks to whom. Each speculative lock includes a use counter that keeps track of the number of times it has been released by a committing action during the construction of the current block. When a miner starts a block, it sets these counters to zero.
When a speculative action commits, it increments the counters for each of the locks it holds, and then it registers a lock profile with the VM recording the abstract locks and their counter values.
When all the actions have committed, it is possible to reconstruct their common schedule by comparing their lock profiles. For example, consider three committed speculative actions, A, B, and C. If A and B have no abstract locks in common, they can run concurrently. If an abstract lock has counter value 1 in A's profile and 2 in C's profile, then C must be scheduled after A.
Algorithm 1 MineInParallel(T ) -Mine in parallel
Require: A set of contract transactions T Ensure: A serial order S of transactions and a happens-before graph H of the locking schedule 1:
Initialize log L for recording locking operations 3:
Execute all transactions t ∈ T in parallel, recording locking activity in L 4: Generate happens-before graph H from L 5:
Create the serial ordering S via a topological sort of H 6:
return (S, H ) 7: end function A miner includes these profiles in the blockchain along with usual information. From this profile information, validators can construct a fork-join program that deterministically reproduces the miner's original, speculative schedule. Algorithm 1 provides a high-level sketch of the operation of the miner. By logging the locking schedule during parallel execution, the miner generates a happens-before graph of transactions according to the order in which they acquire locks and commit. A valid serial history is produced from a topological sort of this graph. Algorithm 2 constructs the validator by scanning through the list of actions as they appear in the serial history. A fork-join task is created for each action and stored for lookup by its identifier. Each task will first lookup and join any tasks that must precede it according to the locking schedule before executing the action itself.
Algorithm 2 ConstructValidator(S, H ) -Construct a parallel validator
Require: A set of contract transactions T and the happens-before graph H from the miner Ensure: A set of fork-join tasks ensuring parallel execution according to H 1: function ConstructValidator(B) 2:
Initialize a mapping F from each transaction t ∈ T to its fork-join task f 3:
Create the happens-after graph H by reversing the edges of
for all t ∈ S do 5:
B ← all transactions u ∈ H that happen immediately before t, i.e., its outedges 6:
Create a fork-join task f for t that first joins with all tasks in B, i.e.,
Save the new fork-join task in F, i.e., F.put(t, f ) 8:
end for 9:
return the value set of F, the fork-join tasks 10: end function
The resulting fork-join program is not speculative, nor does it require inter-thread synchronization other than forks and joins. The validator is not required to match the miner's level of parallelism: using a work-stealing scheduler [2] , the validator can exploit whatever degree of parallelism it has available. The validator does not need abstract locks, dynamic conflict detection, or the ability to roll back speculative actions, because the fork-join structure ensures that conflicting actions never execute concurrently.
To check that the miner's proposed schedule is correct, the validator's virtual machine records a trace of the abstract locks each thread would have acquired, had it been executing speculatively. This trace is thread-local, requiring no expensive inter-thread synchronization. At the end of the execution, the validator's VM compares the traces it generated with the lock profiles provided by the miner. If they differ, the block is rejected.
Miners have an incentive to publish a block's fork-join schedule along with the block to induce other miners to build on that block. If a miner publishes an incorrect schedule, the error will be detected and that block rejected. A miner could publish a correct schedule equivalent to, but less parallel than the schedule it discovered, it would have no motive to do so because a less parallel schedule makes that block less attractive than competing blocks with more parallel schedules, and the miner will be rewarded only if the other miners choose to build on that block. Because fork-join schedules are published in the blockchain, their degree of parallelism is easily evaluated.
Correctness
Concurrent calls to smart contract functions might leave persistent storage in an inconsistent state not possible after a serial execution. In this section we show that, instead, every concurrent execution permitted by our proposal is equivalent to some sequential execution. Because miners are free to choose the order in which contracts appear in a block, any sequential execution will do. We further show that the executions of validators are equivalent to their corresponding miners.
Our correctness arguments in this section build on the Push/Pull model [16] , which is expressive enough to model the transactional boosting [11] algorithm that our miners execution. Next, we build on top of Push/Pull with a new model that captures validators' behavior and show that it simulates Push/Pull. This is not enough, however. We finally show that the validator's concurrent behavior is equivalent to the miner's concurrent behavior, even though each may simulate different serial executions.
Preliminaries
We now establish some preliminaries and, for the benefit of the reader, we provide a short background on the Push/Pull model. The Push/Pull model is capable of characterizing a wide range of transactions and witnessing their serializability/opacity. It decomposes state into thread-local components and a shared component, each represented as logs of operations. Concurrent transactions use the Push rule to share operations from their local log into the single shared log (or Unpush to rollback). Meanwhile, other threads may Pull those effects from the shared log into their local view. This model is serializable and, in some cases, satisfies opacity. As we will now explore, one benefit of this semantic model is that most of the elaborate reasoning (coinduction, simulation relations, invariants, etc.) necessary for proving the correctness of a transactional algorithm is contained within the semantic model, and we don't need to redo these steps in this paper.
For the most part, to understand this section it is not necessary to understand the inner workings of Push/Pull. We begin with some definitions:
Object methods/operations id ∈ I ds Operation identifiers.
Each thread executes code c ∈ C from some programming language that includes lock acquisition lock( ), method calls such as o.m(x) (consisting of object name o, method name m, and a vector of arguments x), and a skip statement.
We use the notation tx c to mean that the code c is a single (unnested) transaction. Reducing c to, say, c , is denoted as reducing tx c to tx c , indicating the transactional context for the reduction. 5 For our purposes, there will be N transactions and each will have a unique id τ ∈ T . We treat all operations as occurring on a single object. Disjoint objects are easily modeled as disjoint sections of a single objects. In addition to the thread-local and shared logs of operations, we also permit additional thread-local state, used to model primitive variables as well as arguments and return values for method calls. This thread-local state space is denoted Σ. Thread code c can also perform updates to this thread-local state, but we omit details for simplicity. As in [16] , we abstract away the programming language with a couple functions: This predicate is true provided that there is a reduction of c to skip that does not encounter more work, e.g. a method call or a local operation.
The definition of c (o.m(x)
, c ) can easily be instantiated for simple programming languages.
Miners
Recall that, in the absence of our approach to concurrent mining, a miner would assemble a collection of N transactions to execute in a serial order:
In Sect. 3, we described how these N transactions can instead be executed speculatively. For simplicity, assume that each of the N transactions is executed in parallel. The execution of a transaction τ i reduces c i , and whenever it reaches an operation o.m(x), it will have first acquired a set of abstract locks ⊆ L that satisfies the boosting lock rule [11] :
Definition 1 (Boosting abstract locks [11] ) Before executing an operation o.m(x), the transaction must acquire a set of locks such that for every concurrent operation o.n(y) of an uncommitted transaction that has acquired locks , if o.m(x) does not commute 6 with o.n(y), then ∩ = ∅.
That is, if the operation conflicts with another concurrent operation, then there will be at least one lock that is acquired by both transactions. A threads commits once it has reduced tx c i completely to skip. At commit, the thread releases all held abstract locks. We model miner execution using Push/Pull. A configuration in the Push/Pull model has a component {c, σ, L} to represent each thread, executing code c with a primitive variable state σ . The final component L is a log (list) of the operations (e.g.
..]) performed thus far by the transaction. This log is only viewable locally. We denote the set of all thread components as T, treating it as a list and using notations such as T 1 ·{c i , σ i , L i }·T 2 to focus on the i-th transaction. The Push/Pull configuration also has a single shared log G which is a sequence of operations that have been shared to the global view. The rules Push, Unpush, Pull, Unpull in [16] ferry operations between local logs and the shared log, and correspond to different logical stages in a transactional system.
We denote the miner transition relation as T, G M T , G and it is an instance of the Push/Pull model (i.e.
M ⊆ P P where P P is the main transition relation in [16] ). The initial configuration is:
Here σ i is a transaction-local initial state, each log L i = ∅, and the initial shared state is represented as an empty log of operations G 0 = ∅. Let Π M denote the sets of traces (sequences of configurations) of M . As noted by Satoshi Nakanishi [25] , code executed by miners must be deterministic. Therefore, we assume that c (o.m(x), c ) is deterministic and that every operation o.m(x) is deterministic.
The atomic machine [16] 
Miners emit happens-before
Our miners emit an event log E, which is a sequence, each element being an event:
Commit of txn τ , release all locks From this event log collected across all threads, we construct the happens-before relation. Let e < E e denote that event e occurs before event e in log E. A happens before relation, denoted : T × T is a partial order on the execution of transactions. (A more fine-grained relation is possible, that orders individual operations rather than transactions.) From the event log, our system constructs the relation:
Intuitively, this means that transaction τ is ordered before τ if it commits first and there is at least one lock that both transactions acquire. Notice that transactions that acquire the same locks will be ordered in even if they were not concurrent in E. Indeed, in the following lemma, we prove that the miner machine orders all conflicting transactions. Proof By induction on the event log and miner transition system. Due to Definition 1, since o.m(x) does not commute with o.n(y), there will be some lock acquired first by both τ 1 and τ 2 . If the transactions are non-concurrent, then they will be ordered accordingly. Otherwise, the first one to acquire will be ordered before the other.
Validator
We now describe a transition system that models the validator. The transition system is a conservative extension of Push/Pull [16] , constrained to abide by the happens-before relation , but free to perform operations on the shared state without acquiring abstract locks or checking for conflicts. The validator transition relation is denoted T, G V T , G . It is the same as P P , but modified in two ways:
1. We remove condition (ii) from the Push rule. Roughly speaking, this condition requires that a thread can only perform an operation if it commutes with all active operations of uncommitted transactions. By removing this condition, operations can be ferried from the local log to the shared log without checking commutativity with concurrent operations. 
The
Step rule selects a single transaction and lets it take a single step forward. We modify it, adding the condition (i) below:
We abuse notation here, conflating/equating a transaction id τ with the code tx c that it executes. Hence the quantification above gives us the current code tx c being executed by each τ such that τ τ . This change to the Step rule delays each transaction τ until each predecessor has completed, effectively implementing a thread join operation. Finally, the initial configuration is the same as the initial configuration of the miner:
With each L i = ∅ and G 0 = ∅. Let Π V denote the sets of traces of V . We now show that the validators are serializable. Step. The relation is maintained because transitions have only been removed: the constraint has been added.
2.
Push. Condition (ii) has been removed in V , so we must show that it is satisfied in P P . Condition (ii) requires that
op. This means that when the validator performs an operation op, that it must commute with all other operations of active transactions. This is ensured by Lemma 2 in concert with (1) above. Above we have used the asymmetric log relation that lets one compare logs in terms of observational equivalence (more detail in [16] ). defines an equivalence class over these executions ( Proof Assume not. Then π is not equal to π , so they reach final configurations A, l and A , l respectively and one of the two cases must hold:
1. l = l . There must be two transactions τ, τ that conflict and τ is before τ in π , but τ is before τ in π . By Lemma 2, places some order on all pairs of conflicting transactions. Contradiction. 2. σ i = σ i for some (skip, σ i ) ∈ A and (skip, σ i ) ∈ A .
Recall that, in both traces, transaction tx c i begins from the same state σ 0 . If σ i = σ i , then there is some operation o.m(x) in tx c i that does not commute with some other operation o.n(y) in another transaction. However, by Lemma 2, places some order on all pairs of conflicting transactions. Contradiction.
We now show that the validator trace is equivalent to the miner trace. When applying the Push/Pull results to obtain an equivalent serial trace for a given interleaved trace, we again use the asymmetric log relation (lifted from logs to traces) because, technically, the relation is about observational inclusion rather than equality.
Theorem 1 For every miner trace π M ∈ Π M emitting happens-before for and validator trace
Proof By Lemma 4, it suffices to show that orders all traces in Π M and Π V .
In summary, although the validator is constrained by the miner's happens before relation, the validator is not constrained to the miner's commit order. We have shown that they are nonetheless equivalent.
Implementation
Because the EVM is not multithreaded, our prototype uses the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Speculative actions are executed by the Scala Software Transactional Memory Library (ScalaSTM [20] ).
Examples of smart contracts were translated from Solidity into Scala, then modified to use the concurrency libraries. Each function from the Solidity contract is turned into a speculative transaction by wrapping its contents with a ScalaSTM atomic section. Solidity mapping objects are implemented as boosted hashtables, where key values are used to index abstract locks. Additionally, solidity struct types were translated into immutable case classes. Methods take a msg field to emulate Solidity contracts' global state, which includes details of the transaction, addresses of participants, and so on. Scalar fields are implemented as a single boosted mapping. The Solidity throw operation, which explicitly rolls back a contract execution, is emulated by throwing a Java runtime exception caught by the miner. In our prototype, abstract locks are implemented via interfaces exported by ScalaSTM, relying on the native deadlock detection and resolution mechanisms in ScalaSTM. Miners manage concurrency using Java's ExecutorService. This class provides a pool of threads and runs a collection of callable objects in parallel. A block of transactions in Ethereum is implemented as a set of callable objects passed to the thread pool. To generate locking profiles from the parallel execution, we instrument smart contracts to log when atomic sections start and end, as well as calls to boosted operations. From the log, we can encode the locking schedule as a happens-before graph for the validator. The validator transforms this happens-before graph into a fork-join program. Each transaction from the block is a fork-join task that first joins with all tasks according to its in-edges on the happensbefore graph.
Virtual machine comparisons
While our approach is implemented on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) the two most popular blockchains supporting smart contracts have their own custom VMs: the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) and Hyperledger Fabric. In this section we briefly discuss the differences between our implementation on the JVM and what modification to support concurrency would be necessary in the EVM.
EVM versus JVM
Briefly leaving aside the issue of concurrency, there are a number of architectural differences between the EVM and the JVM, potentially raising the concern that our experimental results would not generalize to a hypothetical multithreaded EVM.
For example, the EVM's native word size is 256 bits to simplify interactions with cryptographic hashes; however, both the JVM and the modern CPUs likely to be executing either EVM or JVM bytecode have native word sizes of either 32 or 64 bits. Thus there is likely to be a large constant factor slowdown to execute simple arithmetic operations on the EVM as compared to the JVM. In absolute terms, this means that gains of even moderate concurrency are likely to be amplified on the EVM. For example, a 4× speedup of a 500 ms operation would save 375 ms; whereas on a faster architecture, the same operation might only take 125 ms to begin with, and a 4× speedup would save only 93.75 ms. In relative terms, a constant factor in the cost of basic operations makes absolutely no difference in the degree of concurrency.
A multithreaded EVM
To implement our approach in the EVM, several modifications for concurrency necessary. Notably, however, the EVM instruction set need not change, and developers can use existing smart contracts. Since we base our concurrency on boosting, the contract developers need not implement any explicit concurrency.
The first modification necessary is to make the EVM multithreaded. The EVM needs to be able to take all transaction simultaneously and fork multiple threads. In the JVM this is already supported with the Executor service. Similar functionality is required for the EVM. To enable safe speculative concurrency, the EVM needs abstract locks for memory access. The EVM provides a flat, dictionary-style memory model for persistent storage, which requires per-key abstract locks for fine-grained concurrency.
To support validators requires not only changes the EVM but also changes to the block format. After recording the locking schedule from executing smart contract concurrently, the EVM needs to export the happens-before graph of contract executions for use by validators. To record this schedule on the blockchain requires an expanded block format that can efficiently store the edges of the happens-before graph. The size of this entry in the block format should be adjustable to the size of the graph. The EVM also needs to be extended to support fork-join execution. The JVM provides the machinery to create and run fork-join programs, and the EVM requires similar functionality.
Ethereum versus hyperledger
In Hyperledger Fabric, a validator executes a block's transactions concurrently against the most recent "world state", and collects the transactions' read and write sets. It then orders the transactions and sequentially checks whether each successive transaction's read set is current. If so, the validator installs that transaction's write set, and if not, it discards the transaction and tries it later [1] . This technique, however, does not address the problem of helping Ethereum validators to replay transactions in parallel. Validators in Fabric do not need to replay transactions because it uses BFT consensus, not proof-of-work. Another minor difference is that conflicting transactions are discarded rather than scheduled.
Experimental evaluation
Our goal is to improve throughput for miners and validators by allowing unrelated contracts to execute in parallel. To evaluate this approach, we created a series of benchmarks for sample contracts that vary the number of transactions and their degree of conflict. These benchmarks are conservative, operating on only one or a few contracts at a time and permitting higher degrees of data conflict than one would expect in practice.
Our experiments are designed to answer two questions. (1) For a given amount of data conflict, how does speedup change over increasing transactions? We expect to see more speedup as the number of transactions increases, limited by the number of cores available on the underlying hardware. (2) How does the speedup change as data conflict increases? For low data conflict, we expect our parallel miner to perform better than serial. But as data conflict increases, we expect a drop-off in speedup, limited by core availability.
Contract selection
The evaluate our approach, we selected four contracts adapted from real-world examples of how smart contract are used in practice. Two contract, Ballot for voting and SimpleAuction for an auction, The code was adapted from contract examples in the Solidity documentation [22] . Two are taken from actual contract implementations used in practice: EtherDoc, a document management system, and Token, an implementation of the ERC-20 token contract standard. 7 These contract were chosen to represent the wide variety of use-cases for smart contracts, ranging from financial applications with Token, collaborative activities with Ballot and SimpleAuction, as well as utilities with EtherDoc. Because of the variety of applications, the smart contracts use and share data in very different ways, and therefore we expect different speedup profiles during testing. For instance, we don't expect double-voting in Ballot to cause a great of a slowdown as transfering tokens to the same account with Token. In the former, contention is only with the voter's own data while the latter causes contention for a single user's data.
The speedups are not meant for comparison between contracts. Rather they are to demonstrate the range of performance improvements that our approach will achieve across a variety of contract use-cases.
Benchmarks
There are five benchmarks, one for each of the example contracts we implemented, Ballot, SimpleAuction, EtherDoc, and Token, as well as one Mixed benchmark containing transactions from all other contracts. For each benchmark, our implementation is evaluated on blocks containing between 10 and 400 transactions with 15% data conflict, as well as blocks containing 200 transactions with data conflict percentages ranging from 0 to 100% data conflict. The data conflict percentage is defined to be the percentage of transactions that contend with at least one other transaction for shared data. As we will see, the impact of data conflict on speedup depends on the contract implementation.
These benchmarks are conservative. For all benchmarks besides Mixed, the entire block operates on the same contract, calling only one or two methods. In reality, mined blocks contained transactions on unrelated contracts and accounts. While the theoretical maximum number of transactions per block is currently around 200 transactions, 8 we test a wide range from 10 to 400. This maximum increases and decreases over time, as determined by miner preference [10] . In practice, the number of transactions can be far fewer per block, e.g., when there are costly transactions. For testing speedup over number of transactions, we fix the data conflict rate at 15%, though we expect that blocks in practice rarely have very much internal data conflict. While we did not measure data conflict in the existing blockchain, our approach implemented in EVM could be used to collect such data on an existing blockchain. For testing speedup as data conflict increases, we fix the number of transactions per block to 200, the current theoretical maximum.
Ballot
This contract is an example voting application from the Solidity documentation [22] and is described in Sect. 2. For all benchmarks, the contract is put into an initial state where voters are already registered. All block transactions for this benchmark are requests to vote on the same proposal. To add data conflict, some voters attempt to double-vote, creating two transactions that contend for the same voter data. 100% data conflict occurs when all voters attempt to vote twice.
SimpleAuction
This contract, also from the Solidity documentation [22] implements an auction. There is a single owner who initiates the auction, while any participant can place bids with the bid() method. A mapping tracks how much money needs to be returned to which bidder once the auction is over. Bidders can withdraw() their money. For the benchmarks, the contract state is initialized by several bidders entering a bid. The block consists of transactions that withdraw these bids. Data conflict is added by including new bidders who call bidPlusOne() to read and increase the highest bid. The rate of data conflict depends on how many bidders are bidding at the same time, thus accessing the same highest bidder. 100% data conflict happens when all transactions are bidPlusOne() bids. 8 A transaction costs 21,000 gas plus the gas for the computation [24] . The gas limit on block 3,110,235 (latest as of writing) was 4,005,875, a maximum close to 200.
EtherDoc
EtherDoc 9 is a "Proof of Existence" decentralized application (DAPP) that tracks per-document metadata including hashcode and owner. It permits new document creation, metadata retrieval, and ownership transfer. For the benchmarks, the contract is initialized with a number of documents and owners. Transactions consist of owners checking the existence of the document by hashcode. Data conflict is added by including transactions that transfer ownership to the contract creator. As with SimpleAuction, all contending transactions touch the same shared data, so we expect a faster drop-off in speedup with increased data conflict than Ballot. 100% data conflict happens when all transactions are transfers.
Token
Token is based on an implementation of a standard token contract. 10 It allows a contract owner to create an initial set of tokens, maintains account balances for users participating in the contract, and provides methods to transfer tokens to between users. For the benchmarks, the contract is initialized with a set of tokens and a number of users. Transactions consist of users approve token transfers back to the owner account. Data conflict is added by including transactions that perform the actual transfer of tokens to the contract owner, which compete for shared state, i.e., the owner's account balance.
Mixed
This benchmark combines transactions on the above smart contracts in equal proportions, and data conflict is added the same way in equal proportions from their corresponding benchmarks.
Adding contention
In order to introduce and measure speedup under contention, we add varying percentages of conflicting transactions. The contract runners take a conflict percentage parameter, which controls the percentage of conflicting transactions vs. the non-conflicting transactions.
The source of contention is different for each contract, because each uses shared data in a different way. In all contracts, conflicting transactions are those that attempt to write to the same shared data. Depending on the contract, however, the contention that a single may conflict with only one or a few other transaction or all other transactions. We expect this result in large differences in speedups between the different contracts. This means that speedup graphs are not comparable between different contracts. This is expected, because the contracts represent very different ways in which data sharing occurs in a smart contract.
The contracts have been chosen to represent different, common use-cases for smart contracts. For example, an auction contract keeping track of the highest bid causing any bid transactions to contend for the same contract. A voting contract that protects against double-votes would only see contention for a particularly voter's data if that voter attempts to double vote rather than. In this case, the contract may still have a speedup at 100% contention, because the conflicting transactions are not all contending for the same data.
Conflicting transactions are added for each contract in the following ways:
Ballot
At 0% contention, all transactions are separate voters, each voting once. Contention is added by having voters attempt to double-vote. The percentage of contention is a measure of how many transactions conflict with at least one other tranaction. At 100% contention, all the voters are attempting to double-vote. If there are 100 transactions, there are 50 voters, each issues two voting transactions. Not all transactions are contending for the same data, rather there are 50 separate voting entries, each with two transactions contending for them.
SimpleAuction
Before the experiment, the contract state is initialized by entering a bid for each user. When running the experiment at 0% contention, all transactions are to remove the bid for each user, which incurs no conflict for any transaction. Contention is increased by replacing a percentage of the transactions with a transaction that increments a user's bid. Incrementing a bid conflicts always conflicts with all other increment transactions, because incrementing requires modifying the field that tracks the current highest bid for the entire contract. At 100% contention, all transactions are to increment bids and contend for the same shared state.
EtherDoc
EtherDoc is initialized with a set of user's, each of which owns a single document. At 0% contention, all transactions are a check for the existence of each user's document by that user. Since these are reads of separate data, no contention exist. Contention is added by including transactions that transfer ownership of the document to the same user (the contract owner). The transfer transactions all conflict with each other, since the owner's account data is touched by all the conflicting transactions. At 100% contention, all transactions are document transfers to the owner's account.
Token
This contract is initialized with a set of users, each having the same account balance. At 0% contention, the transactions for the experiment consist only of each user approving a token transfer to the same account, the owner account. The approve/transer convention is a common use-case for transferring tokens between accounts: rather than user A sending money to user B, user A approves a certain amount to transfer and user B initiates the send. Approving a transaction to the same user incurs no conflict, because it only affects the send account, not the receive account. Contention is added by including transactions that transfer tokens to the same owner account. At 100% contention, half of the transactions are approve the transfer and half are to perform the actual transfer the owner account. Because only half the transactions conflict with each other we would still expect a speedup even at 100% contention.
Block size and contention
We ran our experiments on a 4-core 3.07 GHz Intel Xeon W3550 with 12 GB of memory running Ubuntu 16. All of our experiments run on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) with JIT compilation disabled. Parallel mining and validation are run with a fixed pool of three threads, leaving one core available for garbage collection and other system processes/threads.
For each benchmark, blocks were generated for each combination of the number of transactions and data conflict percentage. Each block is run on the parallel miner, the validator, and a serial miner that runs the block without parallelization. The serial results serve as the baseline for computing speedup. The running time is collected five times and the mean and standard deviation are measured. All runs are given three warm-up runs per collection. Figures 3 and 4 show the speedup of the parallel miner and validator relative to the serial miner for all benchmarks. (The running times with mean and standard deviation can be found in Figs. 7 and 8) . Figures 3 plots the speedup over the number of transactions in the block at a fixed data conflict percentage of 15%. The speedup for all benchmarks follows roughly the same pattern. For low numbers of transactions, there is no speedup and even some slowdown. This is likely due to data conflict as well as the overhead of multithreading. For over around 50 transactions, there is a speedup that increases to about 2×, in line with expectations from a thread pool of size three. EtherDoc is an exception, seeing less than 1.5× speedup. The validator generally has a higher speedup than the parallel miner. This is because the parallel miner has done Fig. 3 The speedup as block size increases of the miner and validator versus serial mining for Ballot, SimpleAuction, EtherDoc, and Token benchmarks Fig. 4 The speedup as data conflict increases of the miner and validator versus serial mining for Ballot, SimpleAuction, EtherDoc, and Token benchmarks Fig. 5 The speedup for the Mixed benchmark. The first chart is the speedup as block size increases, while the second is the speedup as data conflict increases the hard work of finding data conflict and produced a locking schedule for the validator to follow.
The charts in Fig. 4 plot the speedup as the data conflict percentage increases for fixed blocks of 200 transactions. As data conflict increases, the miner's speedup reduces from 2× to close to serial as many transactions touch shared data. The validator also starts at around 2× with no data conflict, but goes down to about 1.5×, again benefiting from the work of the parallel miner.
Ballot's parallel mining hovers around 1.5× speedup, suffering little from the extra data conflict. Ballot's speedup does not drop to 1×, because the conflicting transactions are not contending for the same data. Data conflict in SimpleAuction and EtherDoc, however, has an expectedly higher impact, because each contending transaction touches the same data. Figure 5 shows the the Mixed benchmark. This provides a more realistic view of a block by combining transactions from unrelated contracts. Even though EtherDoc reduces parallelism under high data conflict, when mixed with other transactions, the parallel miner can still gain a substantial speedup. The mixed speedup is effectively results in an average of the speedups of all contracts.
The average of speedups of all benchmarks is 1.39× for the parallel miner and 1.59× for the validator. Table 1 shows the average speedups for each benchmark. Fig. 6 The speedup as the number of threads increase of the miner and validator versus serial mining for the mixed benchmarks Figure 6 shows how the speedup changes as the number of threads increases from two to twenty. This experiment was run on a more powerful machine that than the previous section, which contains 24 processors, each a 6-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5645 2.40 GHz processor. Since this was using a different machine, the results cannot be compared exactly to those in Fig. 5 . At four threads with 200 transactions and 0.15 conflict, however, the speedup is comparable, about 1.5×. As the number of threads grows, the speedup for mining declines, the opposite of our expectation. For validation, there is a greater speedup, reaching a maximum of about 2.5×, compared to Fig. 5 . This speedup plateaus, except for the outlier at 12 threads.
Threads
The results are erratic. The experiment with 12 threads had a steep dropoff in speedup. These unexpected results may be due to the use of a multiprocessor machine rather than a multicore machine. We observed unpredictable assignment of threads to processors: some maxed out a single CPU, while others were spread across CPU cores. While averaging smoothed this effect somewhat, the nondeterminism was great enough to cause the outlier at 12 threads. Since each processor had 6 cores, this appears to explain the dropoff near 6 threads. Concurrency between processors, rather than cores, apparently incurred a high enough overhead to not only prevent an increase in speedup, but reduce the speedup, particularly at 12 threads.
Discussion
These results show that speculative concurrent execution speeds up mining when threads are occupied and the data conflict rate is not too high. Data conflicts among transactions in the same block is likely to be infrequent over the long term. (Miners could also choose transactions so as to reduce the likelihood of conflict, say by including only those contracts that operate on disjoint data sets.) Due to limited hardware, our experiments used only three concurrent threads, but even this modest level of concurrency showed a benefit. Concurrent hardware has proved effective for speeding up solutions to proof-of-work puzzles, and now similar investments could speed up smart contract execution and validation.
Concurrent smart contract execution speeds up miners by enabling them to construct blocks faster before appending them to the chain. But in permissionless blockchains, the bulk of miner time is spent computing proof-of-work for the block after construction. Concurrent smart contracts, however, still provide a big win for validators. Validators spend much time executing transactions, while validating the proof-of-work by miners is fast. Ethereum is transitioning to proof-of-stake to reduce the computational burden imposed by proof-of-work. Additionally, permissioned blockchains eschew proof-of-work, so concurrent smart contract execution provides even more of a boost to throughput to these blockchains.
Related work
The notion of smart contracts can be traced back to an article by Nick Szabo [23] . Bitcoin [19] includes a scripting language whose expressive power was limited to protect against non-terminating scripts. The Ethereum blockchain [9] is perhaps the most widely used smart contract platform, employing a combination of a Turing-complete virtual machine protected from non-termination by charging clients for contract running times. Solidity [21] is the most popular programming language for programming the Ethereum virtual machine.
Luu et al. [17] identify a number of security vulnerabilities and pitfalls in the Ethereum smart contract model. Luu et al. [18] also identify perverse incentives that cause rational miners sometimes to accept unvalidated blocks. Delmolino et al. [8] document common programming errors observed in smart contracts. The Hawk [15] smart contract system is designed to protect the privacy of participants.
As noted, many of the speculative mechanisms introduced here were adapted from transactional boosting [11] , a technique for transforming thread-safe linearizable objects into highly-concurrent transactional objects. Boosting was originally developed to enhance the concurrency provided by software transactional memory systems [12] by exploiting type-specific information. Other techniques that exploit type-specific properties to enhance concurrency in STMs include transactional predication [4] and software transactional objects [13] .
There are other techniques for deterministically reproducing a prior concurrent execution. See Bocchino et al. [3] for a survey (Figs. 7, 8) .
Cachin et al. discuss non-deterministic execution of smart contracts in the context of BFT-based permissioned blockchains [5] .
Conclusion
We have shown that one can exploit multi-core architectures to increase smart contract processing throughput for both miners and validators. First, miners execute a block's contracts speculatively and in parallel, resulting in lower latency whenever the block's contracts lack data conflicts. Miners are incentivized to include in each block an encoding of the serializable parallel schedule that produced that block. Validators convert that schedule into a deterministic, parallel fork-join program that allows them to validate the block in parallel. Even with only three threads, a prototype implementation yields overall speedups of 1.39× for miners and 1.59× for validators on representative smart contracts.
Although our discussion has focused on "permisionless" systems where anyone can participate, the mechanisms proposed here would also be useful for "permissioned" systems, such as Hyperledger [14] , where participants are controlled by an authority such as an organization or consortium. For example, in a permissioned blockchain based on Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (PBF) [6] , the leader might use speculative execution to discover a concurrent schedule for a block, while particpants in the PBFT protocol would use the concurrent schedule to validate the block before voting.
Future work includes adding support for multithreading to the Ethereum virtual machine, in much the same way as today's Java virtual machines. Our proposal for miners only is compatible with current smart contract systems such as Ethereum, but our overall proposal is not, because it requires including scheduling metadata in blocks and incentivizing miners to publish their parallel schedules. It may well be compatible with a future "soft fork" (backward compatible change), a subject for future research.
In addition to a multithreaded VM, we see room for advancement in programming language support for smart contracts. Designing a language that lends itself to finergrained concurrency will increase the success of speculative execution thereby increasing throughput. It would also be useful for the language to provide better control of concurrency, helping the smart contract developer maximize throughput while avoiding concurrency pitfalls.
